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EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder
(2011 – current)

Research Affiliate, Power Auctions LLC (2008 – current)

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, University of Maryland (2011).

Dissertation: *Essays on Package Auctions*.

Committee: Lawrence Ausubel (chair), Peter Cramton, John Rust

M.A., Economics, New Economic School, Moscow (2006).

B.S., Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Moscow State University,
Moscow, 2003

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Auction Theory, Market Design, Game Theory, Microeconomics, Computational
Economics

JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS

“An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations,” *Journal of Economic
Theory*, 177: 495-517, 2018

“A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction,” (with Lawrence Ausubel),
The Economic Journal, 127(605): F334-F350, 2017

“Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns,” (with Christina Aperjis,
Lawrence Ausubel and Thayer Morrill), *AEJ: Microeconomics*, 9(3): 1-27,
2017, (lead article)

“Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction,” (with
Lawrence Ausubel), *American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings)*,
104(5): 446-451, May 2014

WORKING PAPERS

“Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information,” (with Lawrence Ausubel),
revise and resubmit, *International Journal of Game Theory*, January 2019

“Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Dynamic Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel), *under review*, January 2019

“VCG, the Core and Assignment Stages in Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel), January 2019

“Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction,” (with Christina Aperjis and Lawrence Ausubel), January 2018

“Iterative Vickrey Pricing in Dynamic Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel), December 2017

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Exposure vs. Free-Riding in Auctions with Incomplete Information,” November 2013 (inactive)

PATENTS

“System and Method for Enhanced Clock Auctions and Combinatorial Clock Auctions,” (with Lawrence Ausubel), *application pending* (filed on March 2013)

INVITED WORKSHOPS / CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

INFORMS Annual Meeting, “Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Dynamic Auctions,” November 2018

Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design, “An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations,” June 2018

INFORMS Annual Meeting, “An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations,” October 2017

NBER Market Design Workshop, “Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction”, October 2017

Conference on Economic Design (CED), “Efficient Dynamic Auction for Private Valuations,” June 2017

INFORMS Annual Meeting, “Efficient Dynamic Auctions for U-shaped Returns,” November 2016

NBER Market Design Workshop, “Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns”, October 2016

Auctions and Market Design Workshop, “Vickrey-based Pricing in Iterative First-Price Auctions,” University of Vienna, August 2016

GAMES 2016, “Vickrey-based Pricing in Iterative First-Price Auctions,” July 2016

INFORMS Annual Meeting, “Vickrey-based Pricing in Iterative First-Price Auctions,” November 2015

International Conference on Operations Research, “Vickrey-based Pricing in Iterative First-Price Auctions,” September 2015

Lessons Learned Workshop on Canada’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction,

“Enhancements for Dynamic Auctions”, November 2014
INFORMS Annual Meeting, “Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Auctions,” November 2014
International Conference on Operations Research, “A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction,” September 2014
INFORMS Annual Meeting, “The Combinatorial Clock Auction, Revealed Preference and Iterative Pricing,” October 2013
Combinatorial Auctions for Spectrum: State of the Art – Ofcom/LSE Workshop, “Comparison of Combinatorial Clock and Other Auction Designs,” September 2013
INFORMS Annual Meeting, “Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information,” October 2012
NBER Market Design Workshop, “Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information,” October 2010

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Graduate Assistantship, University of Maryland, 2007 - 2011
Fellowship, University of Maryland, 2006 - 2007
Fellowship, New Economic School, Moscow, 2005 - 2006
Fellowship, Moscow State University, Moscow, 2000 – 2005

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Colorado at Boulder

Graduate:

Microeconomic Theory, Advanced Economic Theory

Undergraduate:

Introduction to Econometrics, Market Design

DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE

Undergraduate Curriculum Committee, 2011-2013, 2015 - present
Computing Resources Committee, 2011 – 2015
Graduate Admissions and Assistance Committee, 2011 - present

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Referee: Games and Economic Behavior, Theoretical Economics, Review of Economic Design, International Journal of Game Theory, Strategic Behavior and the Environment, Econometrica, International Journal of Industrial Organization, The RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Management Science

Reviewer: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Program Committee: ACM EC’18 (Conference on Economics and Computation)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Economic Association, INFORMS