Oleg Baranov | Faculty of Economic Sciences | Higher School of Economics

Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction, with Lawrence Ausubel and Christina Aperjis
Iterative Vickrey Pricing in Dynamic Auctions, with Lawrence Ausubel
Modeling Two-Stage Auctions, with Lawrence Ausubel
Spectrum Auctions as Games: Playing the Get Out of Jail Free Card, with Lawrence Ausubel and Sam Dinkin

Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Dynamic Auctions, (with Lawrence Ausubel), International Economic Review, 61(2): 471-502, 2020 preprint
Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information, (with Lawrence Ausubel), International Journal of Game Theory, 49(1): 251-273, 2020 preprint
An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations, Journal of Economic Theory, 177: 495-517, 2018 preprint
A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction, (with Lawrence Ausubel), Economic Journal, 127(605): F334-F350, 2017
Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns, (with Lawrence Ausubel, Christina Aperjis and Thayer Morrill), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3): 1-27, 2017
Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction, (with Lawrence Ausubel), American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 104(5): 446-451, 2014

Higher School of Economics
(HSE)